University of Missouri-St. Louis
From the SelectedWorks of Beth Huebner

January, 2022

Private Probation Costs, Compliance, and the
Proportionality of Punishment: Evidence from
Georgia and Missouri
Beth Huebner, University of Missouri-St. Louis
Sarah K.S. Shannon

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/beth-huebner/78/

Private Probation Costs,
Compliance, and the
Proportionality of Punishment:
Evidence from Georgia and
Missouri
Be t h M. Hu ebn er

a n d Sa r ah K.S. Sha n non

Probation is the most commonly imposed correctional sanction, is often accompanied by supplementary
costs, and can be operated by the state or private companies. Private probation is a unique sanction used in
lower courts, most often for misdemeanor offenses, and is managed by third-party actors. We focus on documenting the process and unique costs of private probation, including the rituals of compliance and proportionality of punishment. We use data from interviews with individuals on private probation and local criminal justice officials as well as evidence from court ethnographies in Georgia and Missouri. For individuals on
private probation, payment of monetary sanctions is a crucial way of demonstrating compliance. Yet the financial burden of added costs for supervision and monitoring creates substantial challenges.
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The scope of probation is wide and deep and
currently—as of the 2020 census—includes 3.5
million people, or one in every seventy-t wo
adults in the United States (Kaeble and Alper
2020). The number of people on probation has
increased fourfold in the past four decades,
which has led some to term the current era as
one of mass probation (Phelps 2020). Concomitant with the growth of probation has been an

increase in the costs assessed by the criminal
legal system overall (Martin et al. 2018; Fernandes et al. 2019) and for probation supervision more specifically (Bannon, Nagrecha, and
Diller 2010; Ruhland 2019; Brett, Khoshkhoo,
and Nagrecha 2020). Costs assessed to individuals on probation are commonplace and can
include a monthly supervision fee, as well as
expenses associated with conditions of supervi-
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sion. Evidence is emerging to suggest that compliance with these costs can pose challenges
(Brett, Khoshkhoo, and Nagrecha 2020), and
failure to pay fines and probation costs can lead
to additional sanctions including the extension
of supervision and incarceration for noncompliance, among other outcomes (Friedman et
al. 2022, this volume; Ruhland 2019).
During this time, there has been a growth in
the use of private probation, a practice not often captured in studies of probation or official
correctional statistics (Phelps 2020). Private
probation is unique and separate from state or
felony probation systems and is used predominantly for individuals convicted of misdemeanor, traffic, or ordinance offenses under
the purview of local courts. Private probation
is also distinctive in that it is managed by third-
party, for-profit entities and often accompanied
by conditions of compliance including drug
testing, electronic monitoring, and specialty
classes (Bellacicco 2013; Albin-Lackey 2014).
Unlike traditional probation, which was designed to provide community supervision in
lieu of incarceration and based on a peer support model, many argue that private probation
has become instead another way in which criminal legal institutions make money (Harris,
Smith, and Obara 2019), as the burden to fund
the system falls on system users (Rosenthal
and Weissman 2007; Appleman 2016). Although
state probation systems certainly charge people on probation for supervision and additional costs of compliance, these entities are
typically funded more substantially by state tax
revenues. Private probation companies, however, promise local jurisdictions that they will
pay nothing for these services because all costs
of supervising misdemeanor probationers will
be covered by fees charged to those under supervision (Schloss and Alarid 2007). This dynamic highlights the distinct profit motive underlying private probation that is less
pronounced for state agencies. Moreover, these
costs of private probation are often hidden
from view and are assessed without traditional
due process protections, making them a part
of the ever-growing shadow carceral state
(Beckett and Murakawa 2012; Friedman et al.
2022, this volume).
In this article, we build on existing work on

monetary sanctions and mass probation by
documenting the process and related costs of
private probation in two states, Georgia and
Missouri. Data for the study come from a series
of qualitative interviews conducted with individuals with legal debt and criminal justice
decision-makers as well as court observations.
Three prominent themes emerge. First, the
costs for private probation are often considerable, layered, and hidden. Second, the rituals
of compliance are opaque and cumbersome,
particularly for those without economic means.
Third, given the barriers to compliance, individuals are often sentenced to disproportionate
punishment relative to those on felony probation. Taken together, our findings show that the
conditions of private probation are multilayered and insufficiently regulated, resulting in
punishments that are disproportionate to the
severity of the offense.
C o s t s o f P r o b at i o n

More than half of people under correctional
control are serving a term of probation (Maruschak and Minton 2020). Like the mass growth
in prison populations over the past four decades, probation has grown to be commonplace, particularly among young Black men
(Phelps 2020). Concomitantly, there has been a
considerable increase in the use of private probation companies in the lower courts, which
largely govern individuals charged with minor
offenses such as misdemeanors and ordinance
violations (Bellacicco 2013; Albin-Lackey 2014).
Nationally, statistics on misdemeanor cases are
lacking, but estimates show that the system is
enormous, some 13.2 million misdemeanor
cases are filed every year (Stevenson and Mayson 2018). Despite the long reach of misdemeanor probation generally and private probation specifically these systems are rarely
studied. As a result, our review of the literature
on probation costs focuses largely on state (felony) probation, except where noted.
The growth in probation has also been paralleled with an increase in the frequency of assessment and costs associated with legal financial obligations (LFOs). The use of fines
associated with probation has grown, though
the true scope of the phenomenon is unclear.
For example, Katherine Beckett and Alexes Har-
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ris (2011) find that forty-four states charge probation fees for felony supervision. Costs for
probation vary widely, some probation departments charge a monthly fee for supervision
that can range from $10 to $150, and others assess a one-time fee ranging from $30 to $600
(Brett, Khoshkhoo, and Nagrecha 2020).
Probation sanctions and associated costs
can be a barrier to success for people under supervision for either a felony or misdemeanor
conviction (Diller, Greene, and Jacobs 2009;
Ruhland 2019). The emerging research suggests
that many individuals on probation do not have
the economic means to pay for monetary sanctions and that the costs associated with probation are stressful, given that nonpayment can
be used as evidence of noncompliance (Ruhland 2019; Ruhland, Holmes, and Petkus 2020).
The assessment of indigence is also not consistent and waivers do not appear to be granted
routinely (Harris et al. 2017; Link, Hyatt, and
Ruhland 2020). Unpaid costs can lead to incarceration or additional sanctions (Colgan 2014;
Heaton, Mayson, and Stevenson 2017; Ruhland
2019). Further, time requirements are considerable because individuals must attend regular
meetings with correctional staff, judges, and
clerks (Evans 2014; Doherty 2016). In short, probation costs can exacerbate the harms of community supervision and are magnified for
those without financial means (Brett, Khoshkhoo, and Nagrecha 2020).
These dynamics are intensified in misdemeanor courts, where private probation companies provide supervision in at least a dozen
states (see table 1). Private probation departs
from traditional state-run probation systems
in several ways. First, individuals sentenced to
private probation are responsible for all
probation-related costs, including any courses
or treatment services required as conditions of
supervision, resulting in what some call an
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“offender-funded system” (Ramachandra 2018).
Some state statutes explicitly mandate that the
costs of probation should only be paid by the
individual—without support from the state,
which is different from felony probation and
often leads to higher supervision costs for clients (Schloss and Alarid 2007). In Missouri, for
example, state law indicates that “neither the
state of Missouri nor any county of the state
shall be required to pay any part of the cost of
probation and rehabilitation services provided
to misdemeanor offenders.”1 Scholars contend
that the costs for private probation are larger
than those of traditional probation, but most
courts do not track the amount private probation companies collect in fees or mandate reporting by agencies (Teague 2011; Albin-Lackey
2014).
Second, although supervision costs are common to probation, evidence is emerging to suggest that individuals supervised by private probation companies are more likely to be assessed
specialty fees for elements of supervision such
as mandated treatment, electronic monitoring,
and drug testing (Albin-Lackey 2014; Latessa
and Lovins 2019). Individuals supervised by private probation departments have reported that
they felt that they were being threatened with
revocation and additional sanctions for the inability to pay and subject to inappropriately aggressive and hostile collection tactics (Albin-
Lackey 2014; Shannon 2020).2
Third, individuals on private probation are
not offered the same procedural protections as
those under state supervision. Misdemeanor
cases are typically not covered by Bearden v.
Georgia, which prohibits probation revocation
solely for failure to make payment (Williams,
Schiraldi, and Bradner 2019).3 In addition, individuals in municipal courts are rarely afforded
the services of a public defender given that
cases that typically do not result in incarcera-

1. Revised Statutes of Missouri (RSMo) § 559.604 (2017). In Georgia and Missouri, some municipalities have
made the decision to manage their own probation services locally, but the lack of state funds for these services
makes the two systems fundamentally different.
2. This focus on collections with the threat of extended sanctions and disciplinary control is not dissimilar to the
nineteenth-century history of working-class industrial life insurance in Britain that involved agents of private
fraternal insurance companies extracting premiums from poor families while ostensibly, though debatably, inculcating them with the value of thrift (see O’Malley 1998).
3. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
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tion, like those on private probation, are not
afforded representation (Alarid and Schloss
2009). Finally, oversight of private probation
companies is far less than of traditional state-
run systems (Albin-Lackey 2014; Harris, Smith,
and Obara 2019; Montes and Mears 2019). Even
in states with a formal state oversight system
in place, such as Georgia and Tennessee, evidence suggests that further structure is needed
and that the current private probation system
puts individuals on probation at risk (Wilson
2018).
R i t ua l s o f C o mp li a n c e
i n M u n i c i pa l C o u r t s

Emerging evidence suggests unique procedural
costs of punishment in municipal courts (Natapoff 2018; Mayson and Stevenson 2020). Researchers have documented an arduous process of punishment in misdemeanor courts
because people must undertake a significant
burden to comply with formal legal proceedings, which often includes a performance to offer evidence that they take responsibility, or
display accountability for the offense (Kohler-
Hausmann 2013, 2018; Martin, Spencer-Suarez,
and Kirk 2022, this volume). The private probation process is particularly opaque and the rituals of compliance are more involved (Teague
2011), yet oversight of the system is scant given
what many perceive as the low-stakes nature of
municipal courts (Huebner and Giuffre 2022,
this volume; Mayson and Stevenson 2020). Individuals also face many barriers to adherence
to court mandates, such as transportation,
which further complicate the process (Cadigan
and Kirk 2020).
Proportionality of Private Punishment

One key goal of an equitable and appropriate
criminal justice system should be to allocate
sentences and judgments that are proportional
to the gravity of the offense. Legal scholars Norval Morris and Michael Tonry (1990) argue that
a void separates probation and prison sentences in the United States in which individuals
on the fringe of these two sentences are not
appropriately considered (see also Petersilia
2003). They contend that probation in general
is an attempt to use community supervision to
account for individuals who occupy this disci-

plinary lacuna, but the result is an often misguided and poorly adjudicated series of sentences that fail to rehabilitate the individual
effectively. Probation was originally designed
as an alternative to prison and a way to provide
rehabilitative services to people in the community (Corbett 2015). The net of probation, however, has widened bringing people under the
supervision of the carceral state who would
have never been subject to incarceration
(Phelps 2020).
The challenge of proportionality is particularly evident in misdemeanor courts, especially
those that engage private probation systems.
Scholars have argued that private probation,
when imposed on individuals with misdemeanor convictions, is used for the wrong group
of people and implemented in such a way that
predictably leads to failure (Bellacicco 2013;
Klingele 2013). In addition to the disproportionate costs of private probation, individuals under this type of correctional control are not
offered the same safeguards and services, including housing or employment services,
something that is commonplace with traditional felony probation (Bellacicco 2013). The
use of private probation is disproportionately
harmful to individuals with fewer economic
means in that private probation agencies often
criminalize such individuals’ inabilities to pay
the fees associated with their probation terms
(Ramachandra 2018). The profit-driven nature
of this system, in which the survival of private
companies depends on the ability to raise revenue, means that individuals are less likely to
be given a reprieve when they cannot pay
(Teague 2011). Moreover, the practices of private
probation companies are subject to very little
scrutiny or oversight in most states, allowing
profit motive to muddle access to reprieve when
individuals cannot pay (Ramachandra 2018).
One illustration of the disproportionate nature of private probation is pay-only supervision,
wherein individuals unable to pay their fines
and court costs immediately are placed on
court-ordered probation solely for monitoring
and collecting court debt. The longer it takes
individuals to pay off their debts, the more individuals must pay in supervision fees and the
more time served on supervision, which in
some cases can amount to more monetary
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sanctions than originally ordered, inflicting
great financial hardship (Albin-Lackey 2014). In
this way, the payment process puts defendants’
freedom on “layaway” until they have the financial means to comply fully (Pattillo and Kirk
2021, 2). Private probation also has a burdensome performative element in that individuals
are required to make multiple trips to the courtroom to comply, whereas those with more economic means can remedy debt in one trip (Bellacicco 2013).
Overall, the goal of this work is to build on
emerging scholarship on mass probation to
document the role of private probation in lower
courts, particularly around the economic and
procedural costs of compliance. Our research
question asks whether and how the dynamics
of probation costs and rituals of compliance
impact the proportionality of private probation
sentences? We draw on evidence from interviews with 130 individuals sentenced to probation, ninety court decision-makers, and more
than four hundred hours of court observations
across two states.
S t u dy S i t e s

Data for this study come from two states, Georgia and Missouri. Unlike other states in the
Multi-State Study of Monetary Sanctions, both
Georgia and Missouri operate private probation
systems in the lower courts. Even so, the legal
and procedural nature of these systems varies
between these two states, which allows for a
more nuanced understanding of the use of private probation in practice. Although the true
scope of private probation is unknown, table 1
provides insight into the nature of private probation in the United States based on our survey
of publicly available documentation of private
probation systems. At the time of this analysis,
only twelve states had documented private probation systems. In our review, we find that most
of the systems are managed at the county or
local level under little state or systematic oversight. Many private agencies simply enter into
private contracts with the court and have no
formal reporting requirements. In contrast,

183

some states, including Georgia, have implemented oversight bodies. For example, Tennessee has developed a Private Probation Service
Council, the stated goal of which is ensuring
that uniform professional and contract standards are practiced and maintained by private
corporations, which are regularly audited.
Most private probation agencies are allowed
to charge, at minimum, $30 per month, although two states, Tennessee and Alabama, allow for means-tested financial assessments.
The term of supervision traditionally lasts for
two years, although variation is substantial.
Legislation rarely addresses the costs of services and treatment required by the court, and
except for Michigan, little, if any state funding
is allocated to private probation services. Again,
Missouri has designated in state statute that all
costs of private probation should be covered by
the defendant.”4 The following discussion describes how these elements manifest in the
study communities.
Missouri

Individuals placed on probation for a felony are
supervised by the Missouri Department of Corrections; individuals with misdemeanor or ordinance violations are disallowed by statute to
be supervised by the state probation and parole
officers. In 1992, as a cost-saving measure, the
state of Missouri passed legislation allowing for
private entities to provide probation services in
municipal courts.5 Some municipal courts in
the state have elected to partner with private
probation agencies; others use local municipal
or county staff. No systematic accounting of the
number of private probation organizations is
undertaken.
Private organizations that wish to provide
probation services must make an application
with circuit courts, but the law provides no
guidelines for the approval of an agency, leaving each court to develop its own. Contracts can
be in place for three years, and there are no
statutory requirements for the qualifications of
program staff. The only caveat is that the
agency and a judge or elected official may not

4. For more information, see Intervention, “Criminal Justice Services,” 2021, https://www.int-cjs.org (accessed
August 10, 2021),
5. RSMo § 559.600.
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Maximum Fee Cap

$40 per month (25 percent of
gross monthly income cap).

$35 per month

$50 per month

No less than $40 per month

None

$75 per month

$52 per month ($50 + 4
percent surcharge fee)

$135 per month

State

Alabama

Arkansas

Colorado

Florida

Georgia

Idaho

Kentucky

Michigan

Michigan Department of Corrections;
county probation offices. “Field
Operations Administration (FOA)” is the
branch of MDOC responsible for parole
and probation supervision. Courts retain
legal control over the defendant’s status

Contract with district courts. Guidelines are
provided in the Private Probation Agencies
Requirements and Agreements form.

Contract with county and local courts

Individual contracts with county or
municipality governing body at the
request of a judge; oversight by the
Georgia Department of Community
Supervision.

Contract with courts. Private entities must
be registered with the board of county
commissioners and file quarterly reports
(948.15(4))

Colorado Division of Probation Services

No identified regulatory agency

Contract with county and courts.

Oversight Body

Table 1. States with Authorized Private Probation Services

Act 232 of 1953 allows for
MDOC to “allow for the
operation of certain
facilities by private
entities”

KRS 533.010(12)

31-3201D(2)

HB 310
SB 367
§OCGA 42-8-6

948.15(2)

CO Rev Stat § 18-1.3-202
(2016)

§ 16-93-306 (8.C.2)

None

Legislation on
Private Probation

2 years

2 years or until restitution
is paid

2 years per charge

One year per charge

1 year, if alcohol-related, 6
months for other charges

1 year

2 years

2 years

Maximum Supervision Length

$60 per month

No less than $50 per month

$30 per month (10 percent
of net income).

$30 per month

Missouri

Montana

Tennessee

Utah

Source: Authors’ tabulation.

$55 per month

Mississippi

Division of Administrative Rules

Private probation agencies are supervised
by the Private Probation Service Council

Contract with courts - must follow
guidelines required in 46-23-1011 of the
Montana Code Annotated 2019 (46-231001–46-23-1041)

Contracts with lower courts. No oversight
board.

Contracts with lower courts. No oversight
board

R156-50.
Private Probation Provider
Licensing Act Rule

Tennessee code
established the creation
of the Private Probation
Services Council §§ 163-901–16-3-911

§ 16-3-901 2012

46-23-1005(2) Montana
Code Annotated 2019

House Bill 80 559,600
2019

None

1 year for most offenses, 3
years for a Class A
misdemeanor

2 years

24 months for high-risk
offenses

2 years

2 years

186

state mon eta ry sa nctions a n d the costs of the cr imina l lega l system

have any relationship or mutual financial interest. State statutes have changed very little since
the original legislation was passed, and Missouri does not require verification of fees collected.
Georgia

Georgia law requires that all felony-level probationers be supervised by the state Department
of Community Supervision but explicitly disallows the state from supervising misdemeanor
probationers, who must be supervised by local
or private entities instead.6 Since 1991, Georgia
law has allowed judges of county and municipal courts to contract with private corporations
to provide probation supervision and collect
money for misdemeanor probationers with unpaid monetary sanctions.7 Currently, twenty-
four private probation companies provide services in Georgia counties and cities. 8
Information is not publicly available on supervision fees and other costs assessed by these
companies; however, media reports from Georgia cite monthly supervision fees between $25
and $45 in addition to start-up fees ($15) and
daily fees of $7 to $12 for electronic monitoring
(Rappleye and Riodian-Seville 2012). According
to the Council of State Government Justice Center (2016), private probation companies in Georgia collected $121 million in fines, fees, restitution, and other payments. In 2015, in response
to the growing number of legal cases filed
against private probation companies in the
state, the Georgia legislature created the Board
of Community Supervision to provide oversight
to misdemeanor probation in the state.9
Georgia courts can sentence people convicted of misdemeanors to pay-only probation
solely for the inability to pay the fines and fees

owed at the time of sentencing.10 The only service provided by probation officers, in this case,
is the collection of payments toward the debt.
The statute specifies that supervision fees for
pay-only probation must not exceed three
months of ordinary probation supervision fees
and that collection of any probation supervision fee terminate as soon as all court-imposed
fines and surcharges are paid in full. A probation officer must file a motion within thirty
days to terminate a defendant’s probation sentence early once all money owed is paid.11
Methods

Data for this study were obtained from in-depth
interviews with individuals with legal debt and
criminal justice decision-makers as well as
court observations in Georgia and Missouri as
part of a larger study of monetary sanctions
(Harris, Pattillo, and Sykes 2022, this volume).
In total, 130 individuals with legal debt were
interviewed; seventy in Missouri and sixty in
Georgia. Interviews were conducted with forty
criminal justice stakeholders in Missouri and
fifty in Georgia and include defense attorneys
(nine in Missouri, ten in Georgia), prosecutors
(four in Missouri, six in Georgia), judges (thirteen in Missouri, sixteen in Georgia), and court
clerks (eight in Missouri, seven in Georgia). We
also interviewed probation and parole officers
(twelve in Missouri, eleven in Georgia); two of
the interviews in Georgia and one in Missouri
were with individuals who supervised private
probation clients. More than two hundred
hours of court observations were conducted at
both research sites. Individuals with current legal debt were eligible for the study, and participants were recruited using several methodologies. The research teams developed flyers

6. Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) § 17-10-3 (2010). Exceptions are made if a person is under
felony supervision but also has misdemeanor convictions
7. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-100.
8. See Georgia Department of Community Supervision, “Misdemeanor Probation Oversight,” 2021, https://
sites.google.com/a/dcs.ga.gov/department-of-community-supervision2/provider-information-list (accessed
August 10, 2021).
9. State of Georgia, House Bill (HB) 310 (2015).
10. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-103.
11. O.C.G.A. § 42-8-103(b).
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that were distributed to state probation offices
and local service providers, and notices that
were placed on Craigslist and Facebook. Interviews lasted approximately one hour and were
conducted at local service agencies, probation
and parole offices, libraries, and other local establishments. Criminal justice decision-makers
were recruited through personal contacts and
snowball sampling (Biernacki and Waldorf
1981).
Individuals with legal debt and criminal justice stakeholders were interviewed using a
semi-structured interview protocol (Harris, Pattillo, and Sykes 2022, this volume). We did not
query participants with legal debt or stakeholders specifically on the use of private probation,
although we did ask about a range of sanctioning more broadly, including traditional felony
probation. The themes described here were
identified organically as part of our probing on
the costs of contact with the criminal justice
system.
A n a lys i s

We analyzed all of the data using a modified
grounded theory approach, relying on both deductive and inductive coding strategies (Lofland et al. 2005). We began by identifying key
themes for consideration including community
supervision, court-ordered programming, discretion, and consequences of nonpayment. We
also did a keyword search for private probation.
Following the initial round of coding, we constructed memos to identify themes and patterns (Charmaz 2006). Through this coding process, three primary themes emerged: the
hidden costs of private probation, proportionality, and the rituals of compliance. We also
used narrative and observational data to document the high cost and cumulative nature of
probation, overall, that provides context to the
two main themes. During further rounds of
coding, we identified additional themes that
centered on the performative nature of compliance and the collateral consequences of private
probation. We achieved interrater agreement
through the consensus-building approach and
documented counterfactuals to dominant
themes (Miles and Huberman 1993; Charmaz
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2006). We assigned pseudonyms for all participants.
C o s t o f P r i vat e P r o b at i o n

Probation agencies assess two classifications
of costs: supervision fees and compliance
costs. For felony probation, many of these costs
are set by statute or statewide policy. For example, in Georgia, the monthly supervision fee
is $32.12 In contrast, monthly costs for private
probation at the misdemeanor level, vary
widely, are set locally by courts and providers
and do not cover the costs of treatment and related programming. Compliance costs include
fees for programming, such as substance abuse
treatment and rehabilitative classes and drug
testing, which are assessed by the judge as a
condition of supervision. In both states, variation was substantial in the frequency and the
nature of programming ordered and the requisite costs assessed by the misdemeanor courts.
Compliance costs were the most noted by
participants. Municipal courts contract with
third-party agencies to provide court-ordered
treatment classes and other mandated services,
and the costs can be substantial. In the lower
courts in both states, we observed individuals
being sentenced for misdemeanor offenses to
a host of programs and treatment modalities
including anger management classes, GPS
monitoring, drug treatment, safe driving
classes, community service, among others. For
instance, one participant in Missouri reported
paying $800 for anger management classes for
a misdemeanor assault conviction. In Missouri,
most classes, like participation in a victim impact panel, would cost $50 per session and have
no agreed-upon duration. Other costs, such as
a urinalysis, vary widely; in one Missouri municipality each screening was $20 and some
participants were mandated to provide a sample biweekly. In Georgia, such costs also vary
substantially. In one misdemeanor court, ten
days on electronic monitoring cost the defendant $10.50 per day. Driving school for traffic
convictions typically costs defendants $40 or
$50 for a six-hour course, depending on the jurisdiction. Anger management courses run $35
per session and total $700 for a ten-week, twice

12. O.C.G.A. § 17-15-13; O.C.G.A. § 42-8-34.
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per week course, as required in one of the Georgia municipal courts we observed.
Individuals are often sentenced to multiple
sanctions, all with different costs and requirements for compliance. During our observations
of a Missouri municipal court, we documented
the case of a forty-year-old female. She indicated to the judge that she was on disability,
but a waiver of fees was not offered. The complicated nature of punishment is detailed in
this court observation.
The defendant pled guilty to trespassing and
stealing, had priors, and asked the judge
whether she could get on a payment plan because she was on disability. For the trespassing case, the defendant was sentenced to pay
a $250.50 fine. For the stealing case, the defendant was sentenced to two years’ unsupervised probation. The defendant, as a condition of probation, was ordered to pay a $350
fine plus court cost, complete forty hours of
community service (which could be set up
by the court, through the city or a nonprofit
organization), and return to court in November, not violate probation, notify court of
change of address, not to go to Walmart, attend shoplifting class, and pay $50 a month
for supervision costs.

The exchange was one example of the layered nature of sentencing in municipal court.
The participant will be responsible for $1,200
in supervision fees over the term of the sentence, costs associated with shoplifting classes,
and fines and court costs, which altogether will
likely total more than $2,000 and be paid on a
disability stipend. Compliance also required a
substantial time commitment, which included
attendance at classes and forty hours of community service, and the failure to consider the
physical needs of the participant is a common
theme echoed in work of this type (Cadigan and
Smith 2021).
Participants also expressed challenges complying with supervision costs. Even small fees
were hard to pay when individuals were juggling
multiple financial responsibilities. Compliance
with these rituals compound on themselves and
conflicts with other obligations. Caroline described how her experience on probation in

Missouri included numerous mandated fees
and was a challenge to balance everyday costs
and compliance: “I mean like, the supervision
fees and stuff are what, because that’s $30 a
month and I have it for five years, so that’s
$1,800 alone. So it’s just, for being someone like
me that can’t get a job, it’s really hard, especially
having three kids, being a single mom.”
Cade echoed Caroline’s challenges in paying
costs given childcare responsibilities. Cade
knew that he wouldn’t be discharged from private probation until he paid the full amount of
his fine, but he often had to choose between
making financial payments and providing for
family: “Yeah, he [the judge] was just, ‘Why you
ain’t paid?’ ‘Man, I got four kids. I’m paying
bills and it’s hard. It’s rough.’ He like, ‘Well, try
to get it something paid. Blah, blah, blah, if you
want to get off probation. That the key to getting off is paying your fine.’ Life is a struggle.”
Even small fees were hard to pay given that
participants were often juggling multiple financial responsibilities, common themes that
emerge in other studies of individuals under
correctional control (Pleggenkuhle 2018; Link
2019; Shannon 2020).
Hidden Costs

Individuals on supervision and decision-
makers we interviewed argued that because private probation companies were profit focused,
conditions of compliance were ordered to help
cover the costs of operations or increase profits,
or both. The costs for private programming,
particularly treatment classes and services,
were often not described to participants at the
time of sentencing. For example, many courts
had a list of go-to programs, which potentially
limits competition in this space and may increase the potential for conflicts of interest.
Drug treatment was the most common sentenced sanction associated with private probation. A local attorney in Missouri discussed the
frequent use of private probation for “virtually
any” municipal drug case, which often involves
the possession of a small amount of marijuana.
He explained, “if you get locked up on a drug
charge, more than likely than not you’re going
to have at very minimum a requirement that
you sign up for the random drug screening program with private correctional services.” Indi-
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viduals are randomly screened and can be
called six days a week and asked to provide a
sample within a three-hour window. If they are
not able to provide a sample or the test is positive, the infraction is reported to the judge and
a violation hearing is scheduled. Further, in
both states, we observed that many participants were ordered to complete regular drug
testing, even if the crime was not drug related
or the individual did not indicate that substance use motivated the crime.
In both states, the process of determining
substance abuse treatment is outsourced to a
private treatment provider who has the ultimate authority to mandate the length and nature of the treatment and requisite costs. This
assessment process was unclear to litigants,
and most agreed to participate without the assistance of legal counsel. A municipal court
judge from a midsize community in Missouri
described the process he uses to order individuals to treatment: “If they see somebody they
think has an issue that needs to be addressed,
then we’ll send them to get an assessment.
There’s three or four providers around here
close. Get an assessment and sometimes it says
come back and just do some extra counseling.
Sometimes it says, kind of like, you need to
maybe have a weekend intervention or some of
that. Occasionally it’ll come back that this person’s got issues and needs long-term treatment, so they try to find a treatment program
that can do that.”
This judge perceived it as his duty to address
the needs of individuals who came before him,
even those apart from the nature of the criminal conviction. In practice, however, regardless
of potential benefit from treatment, the programs were quite coercive and come with financial and time costs (Phelps and Ruhland 2021).
The forceful nature of such “care” is even
more pronounced when individuals are supervised by private agencies that may be more inclined to enforce compliance for the sake of
economic gain. Private probation also creates
perverse incentives for increasing total punishment through its payment structures. In Missouri, for example, private probation companies are paid for violation reports, which leads
to increased scrutiny of probationers’ behavior
and a greater likelihood of additional punish-
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ment via incarceration if violated. A state probation officer in Missouri believed that the private probation companies used this assessment
process to add conditions for supervision that
came with costs. As noted, private probation
companies in Missouri are limited to charging
$50 per month for supervision fees; they can,
however, assess additional costs for drug testing and other supervision elements that increase the cost of supervision to the individual
and potential profits for the company. A local
state probation officer described the process:
“There is a limit, but how they get around it
. . . let’s say for example a guy is on probation
for petty larceny. What private probations do,
they say okay you’re on private probation now,
we’re administering . . . you have to do drug
screen, and you have to do drug screen through
us. And they add on all these additional services that the client is responsible for. And if
the client doesn’t partake in that stuff then
they’re in violation of their probation. And
the next thing you know, they’re going back to
court.”
As the participant explained, the costs of private probation are many and involve several
requisites for compliance. This theme is echoed
by individuals under private control. Charles,
a participant from Georgia, expressed cynicism
with the process and felt that the sanctions
were economically focused: “They try to make
you go through a whole bunch of stuff that you
don’t need to be going through, like anger management, other classes . . . All that extra stuff
that you don’t need to do all that. It was breaking a lamp. Why do I have to do all the extra
stuff? They just trying to make money off you.
That’s all they try to do.”
One Missouri defense attorney explained
how this works relative to felony probation,
which is run entirely by the state:
The private company, because they get paid
for every violation report, they are completely out to get my clients. They will violate
them for any little slip they find, they’ll file
a violation report. The felony violation is
probation and parole. So, they actually lose
their funding if they violate a person, that
person goes to the penitentiary. Then, the
state funding that was going to probation
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and parole goes to the Department of Corrections. They lose money if they violate
someone. It’s in their best interest to work
with them and not violate them when something small, when there are small transgressions. That’s one of the things that was very
interesting to me was that felony probation
is just a better probation to be on than misdemeanor (probation).

The attorney contended that the private probation company was incentivized to violate clients, different from state probation. Given the
potential personal and financial costs of a violation report, individuals being sanctioned for
misdemeanors or ordinance violations potentially face an increased likelihood of failure
simply because of the nature of the supervision
regime. The findings comport with others of
this type that warn against the use of private
correctional systems that introduce financial
incentives that may undermine the primary
goals of correctional and increase the potential
negative outcomes for individuals under supervision (Harris, Smith, and Obara 2019; Montes
and Morgan 2020).
Overall, the costs of private probation are
substantial. The complete cost of probation supervision is seldom announced in court, thus
the full financial burden for low-level offenses
often comes as a surprise to defendants, who
are afforded little due process and provided
even less clarity in this opaque system of multilayered costs.
R i t ua l s o f C o mp li a n c e

Participants on private probation also found it
difficult to comply with sanctions that were often multilayered, time-delimited, and required
frequent trips to court. A clerk in a rural Missouri municipal court described the procedural
hassles that come with private probation:
“They can put you on supervised private probation. They can make you take drug tests every
week, they can make you do 250 hours of community service, they can make you wear, maybe,
electronic equipment. In other words, probation can make you do things and restrict movement and activity.”
A private probation officer in Georgia described how much of this performance (compli-

ance with reporting) relates to ensuring monetary sanctions are paid: “I don’t think it’s that
their behavior needs to be monitored. It’s just
so that they’re keeping in touch and they’re letting us know what’s going on with getting the
fines paid. . . . Usually it’s gonna be, ‘All right,
have you sent your payment? When are you
gonna do that? What amount can you send? Are
you having trouble with this, what do we need
to do?’ Just to make sure that the case gets
taken care of and closed out.”
However, judges often set so many parameters of the probation sentence, which can potentially increase the challenges for the defendant. Evidence from court observations in
Georgia highlighted this theme.
All of the defendants were sentenced to complete module 2 (the teen driving course), “a
driving improvement program.” The judge
noted that the program should only take three
weekends, though he gave all defendants four
months to complete the program. He then gave
possible excuses for not completing the program (“my dog died,” “I had a demanding professor,” “I had fall training,” “I had spring rehearsals”). He went on to say that none of those
excuses are valid given the amount of time he
is allowing to complete the program.
The judge in this case minimized the time
it would take to complete the course, which was
the equivalent of six working days, for a municipal traffic infraction. In another observed
court interaction in Missouri, the judge required thirty hours of community service
within sixty days, as a condition of private probation, for a probation violation. The individual
had yet to meet those requirements and the
judge repeated the requirement and threatened
jail time for noncompliance. In Georgia, we observed two judges in different jurisdictions who
indicated that the defendant should buy a
toothbrush to use in jail if they did not comply.
The judge addressed one defendant, a young
Black woman, saying that he had the ability to
fine her up to $1,000 and twelve months in jail.
He then said, “if you come back having not
completed the program, you don’t have to
worry about the fine, but you do need to bring
a toothbrush.”
Dale described a similar experience that he
characterized as “harassment” as part of his
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regular check-in with the judge: “If you ain’t
complying with everything they say you had to
do for the paying a lot of money or doing all
your community service hours, by they standards, like in a certain time, they make it, like,
they be harassing you. Threatening you going
to jail and doing, they taking you to court.
That’s fine. Take me to court. Ain’t nothing going to change. You take me to court today, I’m
still in the same situation. So you feel?”
Dale was mandated to attend multiple court
dates, which he found extremely stressful because he was having trouble paying the requisite supervision fees and completing the community service hours. He felt that he could not
possibly comply with community service and
keep his job, and the time costs of attending
court further diminished his available time. As
his observations suggest, the numerous, sometimes competing conditions of supervision create a “piling on” effect by which probation and
LFO sentences become onerous (Bing, Pettit,
and Slavinski 2022, this volume; Uggen and
Stewart 2015). Although he felt that the judge
was trying to use jail time to encourage payment, he felt that without a fundamental
change to his current life situation that he could
not meet the time-delimited request (Martin,
Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this issue).
This participant expressed a willingness to
accept some punishment for their wrongdoing
but felt that being under subsequent supervision and paying LFOs was “ridiculous.” We have
many such examples from participants who
said that one form of punishment is fair (such
as fines only), but once they receive more than
one punishment, such as a fine plus community service or jail, their punishment is out of
proportion to what they had done. Many, like a
participant from Georgia, felt that it should be
“one or the other.” “I don’t like the fact that it’s
community service and the fine. I think they
should make it one or the other.”
This “piling on” effect can become even
more cumbersome when an individual is under
supervision by more than one probation
agency. In Georgia, this is possible because felony probation supervision is state run but misdemeanor probation is locally administered,
often by private probation companies. If an individual is sentenced to both felony and mis-
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demeanor offenses in the same jurisdiction,
they are frequently supervised by the state. But
if convictions occur in different jurisdictions,
such coordination is less likely. Chris described
how having to report to multiple supervising
agencies, both public and private, creates an
untenable situation:
At one time I had state probation, misdemeanor probation running at the same time.
They wanted me to make payments here and
they wanted me to make payments there, and
I explained it to them, “I barely have enough
money to pay you but they want me to pay
them too. They want me to report here and
they also want me to report over there. Both
of y’all want me to be working.” It’s impossible to actually please everybody. Even if I
was just reporting to one, again it’s impossible to please your employer and the probation office at the same time. It’s a big strain.

They point out that some people who have
an understanding employer can find ways to
manage the difficult balancing act. Chris captured the feeling of being torn between myriad
competing expectations not only from multiple
supervising agencies but also from employers
as “like a constant burning torturous feeling.”
Maintaining employment is often a condition
of probation and necessary for having the ability to pay off LFO debt. Yet, as participants explain, these conflicting pressures create a situation in which fulfilling these sentences is out
of reach because “it is impossible to actually
please everybody.”
The process of compliance includes performative requirements which can also be taxing
to defendants (Kohler-Hausmann 2013). Judges
weighed heavily compliance with LFOs as a key
consideration in deciding outcomes on probation. Paying LFOs is a significant indicator of
overall compliance with probation, but “just
paying something” can be sufficient (see also
Pattillo and Kirk 2021). An individual on probation in Georgia described their experience.
“They want you to pay something no matter
what. They don’t care if it’s $10 to $100 but as
long as you put something toward your fine or
restitution it shows that you’re trying.” A similar event was observed in court in Missouri,
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where attorneys frequently use adherence to
probation guidelines as a signal for compliance. In court observations, a defense attorney
asked that their client be released from private
probation given his compliance with electronic
monitoring: “[My client] says from May to July
2009 is when all of these priors took place. He
cannot explain why the defendant did these
during this time, must have ‘gone crazy,’ but
he pled guilty and went to prison for those. He
has been on (electronic) monitoring for two
months now with no violations and has a job
working 8 hours a day. He has shown the Court
he should be dismissed from probation as he
“can follow rules and be a productive member
of society.”
Adherence to other conditions that also incur financial costs, such as electronic monitoring, is even more important for demonstrating
compliance. At the same time, noncompliance
with the same conditions due to high costs or
other factors was rarely considered. Thus, although the official reason for noncompliance
is that they did not successfully complete their
class or treatment, the real reason is that they
could not afford to pay the fees. An attorney in
Georgia highlighted this phenomenon: “Yeah,
because they were ordered to complete that,
and if it comes in that those classes come with
fees and charges and they can’t pay that and
they get kicked out of class, well they’re violating probation at that point.”
Overall, we observed a bifurcated system.
Defendants without means are expected to display contrition and accountability for their
crimes through regular court appearances
(Martin, Spencer-Suarez, and Kirk 2022, this
volume); we consistently observed that these
procedural performances of compliance were
in fact routinely waived or avoided by people
with economic means or legal representation.
In fact, we observed people who were willing to
pay more money for fines if it meant they could
avoid the procedural hassle of coming to court
again. Such interactions were not universal,
however. Practices vary, but we did observe
judges reducing economic sanctions in response to defendants’ compliance with other
terms of private probation. In neither state, was
it clear when and how judges make the decision
to reduce final obligations.

D i s pr o p o r t i o n a li t y o f
P r i vat e P r o b at i o n

Our data reveal that the principle of proportionality in punishment is compromised by the
combination of probation and LFO sentences
along three dimensions, especially when private probation supervision is involved: increased sentence length for nonpayment, collateral consequences, and exploitation. In
misdemeanor courts, the intersection of private probation and LFO sentences compromises proportionality when it leads to longer
sentences overall, particularly for petty offenses
such as traffic violations or possession of a
small amount of marijuana, for example. In
both states, individuals who have money and
can readily pay LFOs spend less time on supervision (if any) than those who cannot pay immediately. As a result, several mechanisms enable sentence length to be extended in order to
ensure payment of LFOs.
In Missouri, judges can use the length of
probation to encourage full payment of monetary sanctions. As one probation officer put it,
“There are some judges who are very conscious
of those costs. I’ve even had a judge tell me before that they’re not going to let anybody off
probation with owed fees, and that includes intervention fees or court costs.” Cassie, a participant from Missouri, describes how the
threat of extended probation led to borrowing
money from her mother to pay off her LFOs:
“The $2,000 I had to borrow money from my
mom because it was pressing for me to be able
to get released early and not extend my probation. I borrowed the money from her and then
whenever I got my taxes this year I paid it back.”
Georgia statute prohibits “tolling” or extending probation sentences for nonpayment
of fines and fees. Nonetheless, we routinely observed judges sentencing people with multiple
misdemeanor charges to consecutive rather
than concurrent terms of probation in order to
give them more time to pay. This workaround
was often posed by court decision-makers as a
form of mercy, as one Georgia judge explained:
“The judge indicates that she wants to make all
three probation sentences consecutive rather
than concurrent (for a total of thirty-six
months) in order to ‘spread this money out’ because of the defendant’s pregnancy.”
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In both states, people convicted of misdemeanors can be placed on pay-only probation.
This type of sentence is a way of de facto extending time on probation supervision because
such individuals would otherwise not be placed
on probation at all if they had the means to pay.
In Georgia, individuals can be sentenced to up
to twelve months on pay-only probation for
each offense and stay on until they pay their
LFOs in full or until twelve months expire. Being placed on pay-only probation was often
framed by court actors, especially judges, as
setting people up to succeed by giving them
more time to pay. One judge in a high-volume
municipal court we observed in Georgia said
he was “glad to do it” after a defendant accepted his offer to be placed on private probation supervision for twenty-four months because she could not pay her traffic fines that
day. However, for many, this system only served
to entangle people in the system for longer periods and often bound people to greater surveillance and legal precarity (Pattillo and Kirk
2021). Our field notes in one Georgia jurisdiction provide an example: “Defendant pleads
guilty to both counts. He is charged with $256
for the speeding charge and $1,506 for the drug
charge. The case was processed quickly. ‘Is
twelve months enough time to get that paid
off?’ the judge asks. ‘No, because I can’t work,’
the defendant responds. Judge says that he
does not want to set anyone up for failure and
attorney and agrees to twenty-four months on
probation to get the fine paid off.”
In Georgia, probation agencies can charge
supervision fees only for the first three months.
But, if fines are converted to community service
then the supervision fee is reinstated, which in
practice contradicts the provision of community service for those who are indigent.
The payment process can continue indefinitely in Missouri. Individuals in some of the
municipal courts we observed were regularly
placed on pay-only dockets. As long as the individual appeared in court, no formal sanctioning was applied beyond the continued “process
as the punishment,” whereby the individual is
indefinitely tied to the courthouse. Pay-only
probation was not a universal feature in Missouri. Some municipal courts actors elected to
monitor payment in-house. Although individu-
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als in these courts did face the procedural hassle of regularly returning to court, the additional third-party costs associated with private
probation were not assessed.
Probation sentences can also increase an individual’s total punishment exposure by exacerbating collateral consequences, including difficulty securing employment or housing. Credit
problems are another byproduct of the pressure to pay off LFOs to fulfill the conditions of
probation. Caroline from Georgia explained:
I went ahead and put in for a credit card and
I don’t want to do that. I don’t. But I feel like
that’s my only option to kind of walk away
from it. It’s not fair. And now I have to go
through this whole situation where in two
weeks I gotta come back to her and see if I do
qualify for community service and if I don’t
qualify for the community service, yeah I’m
probably just going to have to put it all on the
credit card and just let them. I’ll just pay it
off on the credit card that way. And I don’t
want to do that cause I’m like, I’m trying my
best to keep it clean and keep rising the score
cause I want to get a home.

In this instance, and many others, both
credit and securing housing are compromised
as a result of having few options to pay LFOs in
order to minimize time spent on probation
(Pattillo et al. 2022, this volume). Lack of transportation due to license revocation as a condition of probation is another collateral consequence that limits defendants’ ability to secure
and maintain employment. One judge in a
Georgia court explained: “If you don’t finish
your probation terms, it’s going to be harder to
get your license back. It may be because there’s
something substantive you haven’t done, like
you haven’t taken your risk reduction class. But
if you don’t show up for probation, and you
don’t pay your probation fines and fees, and
you don’t do what you’re ordered to do, it’s going to be harder to get your license back, one
way or the other.”
In both states, private probation is frequently viewed as a form of exploitation by participants and even by some court actors. This
aspect of private probation supervision undermines proportionality because the fees they
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charge are perceived as out of proportion severity of the criminal offense. Moreover, individuals on private probation are not offered the case
management and services that are part of traditional felony probation, and many questioned what the fees were used for. As one judge
in Missouri put it, “I’m not crazy about some
of the private probation companies just because they’re making money, that’s what their
job is to make money. Somebody owns that
company and they want to do it for profit.” On
a similar note, a state probation officer called
private probation a “scam” and part of the
“good ole boy system” because “their fees are
exorbitant to what their costs are.” Joe in Georgia described this critique from the perspective
of someone on private probation supervision,
“I mean it ain’t, it didn’t cost them nothing to
. . . for me to make a payment, you know. Plus
they get paid when you go to jail, so . . . you
know, like seventy-five dollars a day, so I don’t
see where it costs ’em.”
Overall, we find a striking contrast between
the power of judges and other court actors to
impose arduous sentences for low-level offenses and the lack of recourse available to defendants who were unable to comply because
of the financial strain. Individuals who didn’t
have the means to comply were returned to
court frequently, subjected to more intense
scrutiny by private probation companies that
have a profit incentive to increase costs, and
often had the span of punishment extended,
sometimes indefinitely (Pattillo and Kirk 2021).
As Caroline, a participant from Georgia, put it,
“I don’t want to have to keep paying more
money for more time. That’s not fair.”
D i s c u s s i o n a n d C o n c lu s i o n

Probation is commonplace and the costs associated with this sanction have increased in
recent years (Ruhland 2019; Link, Hyatt, and
Ruhland 2020), but much less is known about
the processes and costs of private probation.
This article provides insight into private probation in Georgia and Missouri where private
probation is widely used in lower courts and
most often imposed for misdemeanor, traffic,
and municipal ordinance offenses. Given the
growth in misdemeanor violations (Mayson
and Stevenson 2020), this work highlights a

unique element of correctional control that has
largely been hidden.
Overall, we found many similarities between
the two states in policy and practice of private
probation. In both states, private probation
costs are routinely imposed, sometimes hidden, and vary substantially at the local level.
One key difference in costs is that Missouri law
limits probation fees charged by private entities
to $50 per month, but Georgia does not have
any statutorily imposed limits on supervision
fees for misdemeanor probation. By and large,
rituals of compliance across the two states are
similarly burdensome and expansive. We also
found several important differences in terms
of proportionality, at least in state policy.
Whereas the Missouri statute allows for misdemeanor probation terms to be extended if fines
and fees go unpaid, Georgia law prohibits the
tolling of probation sentences for unpaid monetary sanctions. Purportedly, this limits the
ability of decision-makers to add time to probation sentences. Yet we also observed judges imposing consecutive sentences for multiple
charges in order to circumvent this limitation.
In addition, recent reforms limit the number
of months that individuals sentenced to pay-
only probation in Georgia can be charged probation fees, whereas Missouri has no such statutory limit. Georgia has also recently formed
an oversight board for misdemeanor probation
within the state Department of Community Supervision, but Missouri lacks any statewide
oversight of private probation companies.
In many ways, the results from the analyses
mimic that found in studies of traditional felony or state-run probation systems (Ruhland,
Holmes, and Petkus 2020). Supervision fees
and compliance costs are regularly assessed
and many individuals face challenges paying
even the smallest of sanctions (Link 2019;
Pleggenkuhle 2018). Individuals supervised on
private probation are routinely assessed legal
and financial obligations that can include court
costs, supervision fees, and treatment costs,
among others. Conditions of probation are also
cumbersome and for many can be coercive,
making compliance difficult (Brett, Khoshkhoo, and Nagrecha 2020).
However, private probation departs from traditional probation in several ways. First, the
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costs and procedural requirements for private
probation are often disproportionate to the nature of the criminal behavior being sanctioned.
Individuals enter the municipal court system
for minor offenses, including traffic and ordinance violations. Yet the totality of costs that
can be assessed is quite large and in some cases
surpasses financial assessments for felony probation. As Alexes Harris and her colleagues
(2019) contend, the private probation process
includes several “cost points” and the layered
nature of sanctioning makes compliance difficult for those without economic means. For
example, participants routinely noted that they
were mandated to programming, such as safe
driving classes or drug treatment, as part of the
criminal sanction as well as to the costs of supervision. These programming costs were often
not described at the time of sentencing and
could be extended for long periods, further
tethering the individual to the justice system
(Pattillo and Kirk 2021). It is this shadow carceral state (Beckett and Murakawa 2012) that
participants found most distressing. In fact, the
private probation system is legislatively designed to be predatory: in many states, such as
Missouri, it is mandated to be client funded,
which shifts the responsibility for punishment
from the state to the individual client, a theme
that emerges in studies of other municipal
court functions (Huebner and Giuffre 2022, this
issue). The use of private systems also incentivizes extended control.
Second, little if any assessment of the ability
to pay is undertaken in lower courts, which offered participants scant reprieve from payment. In our court observations, we rarely saw
judges explain the costs of private probation or
inquire about the defendant’s financial situation. Costs for court-mandated programming
were rarely described to litigants, and the financial situation was not considered by private
companies, which furthered the economic indebtedness of participants. Noncompliance
leads to compounded fiscal and procedural
costs as well as sentence length, all of which
lead to disproportionate sentences for minor
offenses.
Finally, individuals on private probation
have few procedural rights, even fewer than
those afforded in state supervision systems. In-
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dividuals do not have the same legal rights and
access to counsel they would have in a felony
court (Williams, Schiraldi, and Bradner 2019).
Instead, the procedural costs for some on private probation can be higher (Latessa and
Lovins 2019). One example is pay-only probation that affords additional punishment to only
those who cannot pay. These sentences can undermine the principle of proportionality by
elongating the period of supervision simply for
the inability to pay (see also Pattillo and Kirk
2021). In other cases, individuals on private probation are required to attend court on a regular
basis, which often includes substantial procedural hassles, and time was often seen as a resource that could be controlled by the court but
was often in short supply given the multilayered nature of the sanctions and the limited
means of participants (Martin, Spencer-Suarez,
and Kirk 2022, this issue). Taken together, these
factors reveal several dimensions along which
the costs—financial, temporal, and procedural—add up to sentences that far outpace the
seriousness of the minor offenses that land individuals on private probation.
Several policy implications follow from this
research, including the elimination of the use
of private agencies for surveillance altogether.
As stated, the current funding models provide
incentives to extend probation and increase
costs to the detriment of the individual (Harris,
Smith, and Obara 2019). In the case of private
probation, the costs are often disproportionate
to the nature of the offense and exploitative. As
Brittany Friedman and her colleagues argue
(2022, this volume), eliminating monetary sanctions whenever possible includes decriminalizing traffic offenses that ensnare people in
some states, including Georgia and Missouri,
in extended periods of onerous supervision and
additional costs that generate profits for private
companies.
In terms of procedural protections, public
defenders, for the most part, are not used in
municipal courts. In court observations, it is
clear that many citizens entering the courts, often for the first time, do not full understand
their legal rights. We observed clients arriving
at the wrong location, many did not have the
required materials for their case (proof of insurance, financial documentation), and the re-
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search team was often approached for assistance (Spencer-S uarez and Martin 2021).
Individuals on private probation can be punished harshly for minor crimes yet not afforded
due process protections. Moreover, private probation does not offer the same types of programming offered to individuals on state probation. The inequalities in the systems and lack
of data on the potential efficacy of these models
call into question the need for private probation in the first place.
If states are going to maintain probation systems for individuals in lower courts, then the
oversight of private probation should be the
same as that afforded to individuals; comparable procedural elements should be used with
both groups, a theme echoed by others doing
work in this space (Latessa and Lovins 2019). In
terms of oversight, the Georgia General Assembly has recently implemented reforms that empower the state Department of Community
Supervision to ensure that private and governmental misdemeanor probation agencies comply with state law,13 including creating a Misdemeanor Probation Oversight Unit, reviewing
the uniform professional standards and uniform contract standards, approving orientation
training and continuing education for misdemeanor probation officers, and collecting quarterly data from misdemeanor (private and public) agencies. Despite reforms, the narratives
documented by participants in Georgia and
Missouri, a state with little oversight, were similar, which raises concerns over the efficacy of
existing regulatory models.
This study provides a unique perspective on
private probation services, but it is not without
limitations. It centers on decision-makers in
the court and corrections systems, and we were
not able to collect information on individuals
and companies who provide services and treatment to those involved in the criminal legal system. Despite many attempts in both states, we
were not able to speak directly to many employees who provide private services. It is important
to broaden the work of this type to capture the
unique voices of service providers, first, to better understand the nuances of this work and,
second, to document potential best practices

in both public and private systems by comparing outcomes in this sphere of institutional corrections (Duwe and Clark 2013; Wooldredge and
Cochran 2019).
The results from this research suggest that
private probation is a regular part of the punishment regime for misdemeanors and ordinance violations in Georgia and Missouri and
has a disparate impact on people with fewer
economic means. Much remains to be learned
about this element of control, but the results
presented here suggest that the conditions of
supervision are arduous and often include layered punishments that are hidden from regulation and disproportionate to the severity of the
offense. Moreover, individuals with fewer economic means are tied to the system for a longer
period, which reflects larger inequalities of the
carceral system. Learning more about the system of private probation would shed light on
the broader system of punishment as a whole
(Montes and Mears 2019).
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